Hidden inside a sprawling budget implementation bill is a question Canadians should never be asked to overlook: when federal officials cause harm while exercising public power, who pays the price?

Division 2 of Bill C-31 would add near-identical provisions to the Bank Act, Trust and Loan Companies Act and Insurance Companies Act. They would bar actions against the Crown, the minister, financial regulators, Crown employees and others acting under their direction for acts or omissions performed in good faith. Bill C-31 is not yet law; it remains at House committee while the Senate conducts a pre-study.

There is nothing inherently radical about protecting honest officials from abusive litigation. Federal financial law already contains a comparable clause in section 39 of the OSFI Act. Public servants making difficult regulatory decisions should not face personal ruin merely because a decision hurts a private interest.

But Bill C-31 goes beyond protecting individual officials. It expressly shields the Crown and the minister, and the government has not publicly demonstrated a surge of litigation that requires this expansion. At a Senate committee hearing, Finance officials described the change chiefly as harmonization across financial statutes, not as a response to a documented crisis.

That answer is inadequate because harmonization is a drafting objective, not a justification for removing a remedy. The ordinary federal rule is that the Crown may be liable for damage caused by a servant’s fault or tort, subject to statutory exceptions. If Parliament wants to create another exception, it should identify the concrete risk, explain why existing protections are insufficient and show that the new shield is no broader than necessary.

The phrase “good faith” also leaves the hardest question unanswered. Fraud and deliberate abuse plainly do not deserve protection. But what about serious incompetence, a reckless omission or a costly mistake made without malice? The proposed clauses contain no express negligence or gross-negligence exception. Courts may eventually draw the boundary, but forcing an injured person to litigate the meaning of good faith is itself expensive and slow.

Judicial review is not a complete answer. A court may be able to quash an unlawful administrative decision, but that does not necessarily compensate a person or business for losses already suffered. Accountability is incomplete when the state can correct its paperwork yet leave the victim carrying the bill.

The concern becomes sharper in the government’s wider legislative context. Bill C-22 would impose lawful-access obligations on electronic service providers and has drawn criticism from the Canadian Bar Association, CCLA and Citizen Lab over privacy, surveillance and cybersecurity risks. Bill C-34 would create a new digital-safety regulator and broad platform obligations that civil-liberties advocates warn could burden privacy and expression. Bill C-39 would formalize ministerial power to end work stoppages affecting the national interest, which unions say would undermine the constitutional right to strike.

These bills are legally distinct. It would be careless to pretend that one immunity clause secretly governs Internet surveillance, online speech and labour relations. Yet democratic accountability is also about direction of travel. Across different files, the executive is asking for broader discretion, while Bill C-31 would reduce exposure to civil liability in a sphere where government decisions can impose major private losses.

The government says its online bills protect children and equip investigators; it says its labour bill creates guardrails and economic stability. Those objectives deserve fair consideration. But laudable objectives do not eliminate the need for strict limits, independent oversight and meaningful remedies. The Supreme Court has made clear that the right to strike is constitutionally protected, though not absolute. Privacy and expression deserve the same seriousness before new digital powers become embedded and difficult to reverse.

Parliament should amend Bill C-31 to clarify that the immunity does not cover gross negligence or reckless disregard, preserve Crown liability where an individual official is protected, and expressly safeguard judicial review and other public-law remedies. At minimum, the government should publish the litigation history and legal analysis said to justify the amendment.

Good faith is relevant to culpability. It should not become a blank cheque. When the state exercises greater power over communications, work and economic life, the case for accountability becomes stronger, not weaker.